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Euro 2012 – Ukraine’s wasted opportunity?
Sławomir Matuszak, Tadeusz A. Olszański
Ukraine saw hosting the European Football Championship as an impor-
tant project in terms of image-building and modernisation from the very 
beginning. The country’s government assumed, during the presidency 
of Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych alike, that Euro 2012 wo-
uld provide a major impulse for economic development and show that 
the young Ukrainian state was capable of successfully preparing one 
of the most important sport tournaments in the world. Although UEFA’s de-
cision raised eyebrows both in the West and in Ukraine, after initial delays 
the work gained momentum and, shortly before the championship, Ukra-
ine’s progress could be evaluated as being satisfactory at the least. As part 
of the preparations, four stadiums were built or modernised, four airports 
in the host cities were developed and 1,600 km of roads were repaired or 
built from the ground up. The investments have doubtlessly contributed 
to an improvement of the infrastructure in Ukraine, but it would be rather 
inaccurate to say that Euro 2012 has brought about a real modernisation 
of the country. The funds allocated for the preparations were relatively 
modest, and part of them was spent in a non-transparent way, which gives 
rise to suspicions of corruption. 
The chance to improve Ukraine’s perception in the West has been to 
a great extent lost due to the trial of the former prime minister, Yulia Tymo-
shenko, who was sentenced to seven years in prison in October 2011. Over 
the past few weeks, Euro 2012 as a sports event has been overshadowed 
by discussions among Western politicians and in the Western media abo-
ut rising authoritarian tendencies in Ukraine. In turn, football is currently 
treated as a minor issue in Ukraine’s internal politics. The government has 
so far not used Euro 2012 to improve its popularity although hosting it is 
supported by a clear majority of the Ukrainian public. It is still an open 
question as to whether the Ukrainian government will try to capitalise po-
litically on this sports event; this is especially significant as parliamentary 
elections are approaching. 
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The political dimension
All the major political forces in Ukraine have supported the hosting of the European foot-
ball championship from the very beginning. This sports event has not been used by the 
government as an opportunity for propaganda action or to help its current political goals 
to be achieved. Politicians from the Party of Regions have only on a handful of occasions 
mentioned that preparations for Euro 2012 had been made in an ineffective way before 
Viktor Yanukovych’s team took power and that the breakthrough in the preparations for this 
event happened only after the presidential election in February 2010. The key opposition 
parties have not yet used Euro 2012 to 
criticise the government. The main reason 
for this is that such criticism would have 
run up against the positive attitude to 
Euro 2012, which is predominant among 
the Ukrainian public. Another reason is 
that the opposition has been focused al-
most exclusively on the struggle to have 
Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko released from prison. Nevertheless, representatives 
of the opposition have pointed to cases of misuse of funds allocated for the organisation 
of the championship by members of the government. 
However, the present situation is likely to change once the games are over. If Euro 2012 
ensures Ukraine success (mainly in terms of organisation), the Party of Regions will cer-
tainly be capitalising on this fact in the election campaign. It can also be expected that 
the opposition will note any kind of errors and drawbacks revealed in the preparations and 
the fact that hosting this sports event has consumed huge amounts of money and use them 
to criticise the governing party. Any possible major organisational failures may also give 
an edge to internal disputes within the Party of Regions and thus undermine the positions 
of Deputy Prime Minister Borys Kolesnikov an influential member of the Party of Regions 
and a close associate of Ukraine’s richest businessman, Rinat Akhmetov
The social dimension
The vast majority of the Ukrainian public supports the hosting of Euro 2012. According 
to public opinion polls, almost 90% of Ukrainians have a positive attitude to the fact that 
their country is a host of Euro 2012, almost 60% are happy with this fact and a similar 
number of respondents believe that the tournament will be held in an appropriate way1. 
A slightly smaller number of respondents believe that Ukraine is properly prepared to host 
the tournament, and approximately one 
third of them hope that this event will pro-
vide their country with a stimulus for de-
velopment. Among the expected benefits 
for the country, respondents mentioned in 
first place the improvement of Ukraine’s 
global standing, temporary opportunities 
to earn money, and an improvement in the 
roads infrastructure. The positive attitude 
to the tournament is stronger in the west 
and the east (where the host cities are located) than in the centre and the south of the co-
untry. The belief that the tournament will be held appropriately is strongest in the east and 
weakest in the west of the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 On the basis of public opinion 
surveys published on: 
http://socioplus.com.ua/dw-
ukrajintsi-sumnivayutsya-u-
korysti-vid-evro-2012/, 
http://fakty.ictv.ua/ua/index/
read-news/id/1433036/
marker/important 
http://miete.com.ua/ua/
news/173 and 
http://tyzhden.ua/News/50642
If Euro 2012 turns out to be  
an organisational success, the Party 
of Regions will certainly be capita-
lising on this fact in the campaign 
preceding the parliamentary elections. 
Although the tournament is supported 
by a the vast majority of the Ukrainian 
public, this has not been used by the 
Ukrainian government for to holding 
social campaigns aimed at emphasising 
national pride, the unity of the nation, 
or state and national consciousness. 
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The topic of hosting Euro 2012 has not been used by the Ukrainian government for holding social 
campaigns aimed at emphasising national pride, the unity of the nation, or state and national conscio-
usness. It appears that the main reason for that has been the public dislike of propaganda campaigns 
of this sort, which would certainly remind them of the inept campaigns held during the presidency 
of Viktor Yushchenko. It is also notable that no patriotic slogans have been used in the commercial 
advertisement campaigns of the sponsors of the tournament in Ukraine (unlike in Poland).
The economic dimension
Although the decision on who would host Euro 2012 was taken in 2007, no major prepa-
ration work was done in the first three years due to the deep political and economic crisis 
and the campaign preceding the presidential election in 2010. There were significant delays 
in the implementation of a number of key investments (including the stadium in Kyiv and the 
stadium and the airport in Lviv) and this gave rise to doubts as to whether Ukraine would 
be able to host the tournament. There was a real threat that the number of the host cities 
could be limited to two or even that the privilege of hosting the event would be taken away 
from Ukraine. When the Party of Regions took power in March 2010, the implementation 
of the investments gained momentum. A special position of Deputy Prime Minister for Euro 
2012 was created and was assumed by Borys Kolesnikov. Kolesnikov managed to make 
up for the delays at a fast rate. However, he had to bypass public procurement procedures, 
and the quality of the work done in many cases was doubtful. 
It is difficult to clearly estimate the cost of Ukraine’s preparations for the tournament. Accor-
ding to the deputy prime minister for Euro 2012, Borys Kolesnikov, US$5 billion has been 
spent from the state budget on this purpose2. However, the estimated total cost Ukraine has 
incurred in connection with hosting the championship may reach as much as US$13.4 billion3.
A greater part (40%) of the US$5 billion spent from the state budget was allocated for 
the modernisation of roads4. 1,600 km of the roads were built or rebuilt with this money. 
The focus was made primarily on the routes leading to the cities where the games would 
be played and on the road from Kyiv to the Polish border. The repairs and the construction 
of new sections of the roads cost many times less than in Poland because no motorways 
or express roads were built. The standard of these routes is comparable to that of Polish 
national roads, although in most cases the 
Ukrainian roads are dual carriageways. 
Some sections of the railroads have also 
been modernised, and ten passenger tra-
ins (locomotives and carriages) have been 
purchased from Hyundai. The new trains 
can travel at speeds of 160 km/h, which 
will significantly shorten the travel betwe-
en the main Ukrainian cities. The improve-
ment in the traffic on the roads connecting 
the key cities of Ukraine is undoubtedly 
a great achievement. However, considering the long distances (over 1,300 km from Lviv to 
Donetsk and 1,000 km to Kharkiv), road transport will be of minor significance for football 
fans, especially those from abroad.
Four stadiums were built or thoroughly modernised as part of preparations for the tourna-
ment. The work in Donetsk and Kharkiv, where representatives of big business are enga-
ged in football, was finished in a relatively short time. The first stadium, which was made 
available already in 2009, was Donbass Arena in Donetsk, which was financed by Rinat 
Akhmetov (approximately US$400 million); Akhmetov is also the president of Shakhtar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 For comparison, Poland spent 
US$24 billion on investments. 
‘Ile wydaliśmy, a ile zyskamy 
na Euro2012’, Ekonomia24, 
http://www.ekonomia24.pl/
artykul/880266.html
3 ‘Аналитики: расходы на Евро-
2012 в Украине значительно 
превысят доходы’, 24 May 
2012, Vlasti.net, 
http://vlasti.net/news/142378 
At the same time, the govern-
ment estimates that Ukraine 
will earn between US$1.2 
billion and US$1.5 billion 
on Euro 2012.
4 For comparison, Poland spent 
approximately US$18 billion 
on this purpose. Biznes Gazeta 
Prawna, 21 May 2012.
It was only when the Party of Regions 
took power that the implementation  
of the investments gained momentum. 
They managed to make up for the de-
lays at a fast rate. However, they often 
had to bypass public procurement pro-
cedures, and the quality of the work 
done in many cases was doubtful.
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Donetsk football club. The stadium of FC Metalist Kharkiv was opened at the end of 2009. 
Around one third of the total costs, almost US$100 million, was paid by the oligarch from 
Kharkiv, Oleksandr Yaroslavsky, who is also a member of the Party of Regions. The recon-
struction of the Olimpiyskiy National Sports Complex in Kyiv – Ukraine’s largest (70,000 
seats) and most expensive (US$560 million) stadium – and the construction of the stadium 
in Lviv from scratch, were definitely more problematic5. The lack of a big businessman, who 
would ‘take care of’ the investment, was a significant factor in Lviv. These two stadiums 
were opened at the end of October 2011 (the finishing work lasted much longer). 
Furthermore, four airports were developed and modernised. New terminals were built and 
the runways were developed in Lviv, Kharkiv and Donetsk. Two new terminals were built and 
the existing ones were overhauled at Boryspil Airport in Kyiv. The terminal at Kyiv’s second 
airport in Zhuliany was also modernised; it will be used by members of the national teams 
and UEFA officials during Euro 2012. 
The investments made in connection with the preparations for the tournament provided 
a major stimulus for development to the Ukrainian economy. However, there is a serious risk 
that the construction sector, which has been driven so far by orders linked to Euro 2012, 
will plunge into a deep crisis following the tournament. This will make the growing problems 
in the Ukrainian economy even worse. In the first quarter of this year, Ukraine’s GDP grew 
by only 1.8%, while the government had expected growth of 3.9%.
Preparations for Euro 2012 have not been used to increase the number of the border 
crossing points between Ukraine and Poland. At present, six road and six railway border 
crossing points operate. This means that on the average there is one checkpoint per 50 km 
of the border6; this is significantly below EU standards, which recommend that checkpoints 
should be located every 20–30 km. Eight new border crossing points were planned to open 
when Poland and Ukraine were entrusted with hosting the championship, but due to bureau-
cratic difficulties the work is advanced on only two of them. One of the border crossing po-
ints (Dolhobyczow-Ugriniv) is to be opened temporarily for the duration of the tournament. 
Given this situation, to facilitate the border crossing, 28 ‘Euro lanes’ have been created for 
fans, who will undergo a common border check according to a simplified procedure. 
The corruption scandals
The huge public funds allocated for organising the tournament and the haste in which they 
were spent created numerous opportunities for misuse during preparations, at both the cen-
tral and the local levels. The Ukrainian media periodically revealed information on the ab-
surdly high costs of certain investments7. 
The greatest controversies arose from the 
fact that the key investments, usually with no 
tender held, were implemented by Altkom. 
Little is known about this company, which 
is a group of firms operating in the con-
struction sector. Formally, it is owned by 
Eurobalt Limited, which was founded by 
a yoga teacher from Cyprus8. Altkom is 
based in Donetsk, but it is unknown who 
really derives the profits from its activity. 
The Ukrainian media most often mention 
Kolesnikov. However, given the scale of 
the orders carried out by Altkom, it seems more likely that it is connected to a larger group 
of Ukraine’s most senior state officials and businessmen linked to the Party of Regions. 
5 Стоимость реконструкции 
стадионов к Евро-2012, 
Oбозреватель, 7 July 2011, 
http://sport.oboz.ua/press-
release/skolko-stoit-stadion-
postroit.htm
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 In fact even less, since part 
of the road and railway border 
crossing points are located 
in the same place.
7 One of the most widely publi-
cised cases was the purchase 
of ten wooden benches for 
an underground station 
in Kharkiv for US$80,000.
8 ‘Собственником “Альткома” 
управляет учительница йоги 
с Кипра’, Дело, 24 November 
2011, http://delo.ua/ukraine/
sobstvennikom-altkoma-
upravljaet-uchitelnica-jogi-s-
kipra-168449/
The huge public funds allocated for or-
ganising the tournament and the haste 
in which they were spent created nu-
merous opportunities for misuse during 
preparations. In many cases, the inve-
stments were carried out without public 
procurement procedures being followed, 
and the orders were granted to firms 
linked to the present government.
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It is however worth noting that granting large orders to friends from the business circles was 
also practised by the preceding governments9. 
Altkom was granted the orders for the implementation of the largest investments linked 
to Euro 2012, including the construction of the runway in Donetsk (which cost US$225 
million), the construction of the stadium in Lviv (US$175 million) and a number of road sec-
tions. In total, this company gained contracts worth over US$800 million in 2011 alone10. 
The reconstruction of the Olimpiyskiy was ordered in a similarly non-transparent way; it was 
entrusted to other firms, most likely also linked to the present government11. The great haste 
in which the investments were carried out also affected their quality. 
Conclusions
• Although Euro 2012 has not caused a dispute between the government and the opposi-
tion, the success or failure of Ukraine hosting the tournament may become an element of 
the election campaign. Should the tournament run smoothly, this may make the present 
government more popular, since the Ukrainian public has had a very positive attitude to 
Euro 2012. This is especially important for President Viktor Yanukovych and for Borys 
Kolesnikov. It is in large part due to Kolesnikov’s effectiveness that the preparations were 
finished on time. 
• Ukraine, after five years of work and despite initial very serious delays, is now sufficiently 
prepared to host Euro 2012. New stadiums have been built, airports have been develo-
ped and the road network has been modernised. However, Euro 2012 has provided too 
weak a stimulus for the economic modernisation of the country, since the funds allocated 
for the investments were relatively modest. The money spent was insufficient to bring 
about an infrastructural breakthrough in Ukraine. 
• The multi-billion dollar funds allocated to the investments from the state budget were 
spent predominantly in a non-transparent manner, and in some cases the costs were 
significantly overestimated. The main beneficiaries have been the firms which are in all 
likelihood linked to the ruling class. This proves that for some of them the Euro 2012 
project has also served as an opportunity to derive personal financial benefits. 
9 Мустафа Найєм, ‘Як Тарута 
отримав від Тимошенко підряд 
на 900 мільйонів’, Українська 
Правда, 14 May 2009, 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/ar-
ticles/2009/05/14/3941079/
10 ‘Фирма тренера йоги с Кипра 
дополнительно получит 620 
млн. гривен на дороги’, Дело, 
30 November 2011, http://
delo.ua/ukraine/firma-trenera-
jogi-s-kipra-dopolnitelno-
poluchit-620-mln-griv-
en-168861/
11 Сергій Щербина, Сергій 
Лещенко, ‘Хто заробляє на 
Євро-2012? Перша частина 
розслідування’, Українська 
Правда, 17 January 2011, 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/ar-
ticles/2011/01/17/5796400/  
